One Hundred Years of Morales y Benet v. La Junta Local de Inscripciones: The Use of the Insular Cases to Deny Women’s Voting Rights in Puerto Rico

Joel Andrews Cosme-Morales* July, 2025

Introduction

In both Puerto Rico and the United States, we are governed by an electoral system founded on the principle of “one person, one vote.”¹ Voting in early U.S. history was a privilege, not a universal right, restricted by race and gender.² As a result, the institutional structures of early American political and legal systems tended to exclude certain groups from suffrage, often driven by racial and gender prejudices.³ While the Nineteenth Amendment marked a significant milestone in expanding women’s suffrage, it primarily enfranchised white women, as many women of color—particularly Black, Indigenous, Asian American, and Latina women—continued to face legal and extralegal barriers that effectively denied them access to the ballot box.⁴

The ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1920, recognizing women’s right to vote, marked a significant milestone in American history.⁵ The equal suffrage of men and women became a fundamental pillar in the struggle for democracy and justice. Ensuring both men and women had the same right to participate in the electoral process laid the foundation for an equitable representation of the interests and perspectives of the entire population. This principle, which we in America now consider foundational to our legal system, is the result of a fierce struggle led by women in the 20th century.⁶ Puerto Rico was no exception to that suffrage movement.⁷

On April 25, 1924, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico decided Morales y Benet v. Junta Local de Inscripciones.⁸ The Court relied on the Insular Cases—a series of precedential U.S. Supreme Court decisions that sanctioned the unequal treatment of U.S. territories⁹—to deny the extension of the Nineteenth Amendment to U.S. territories, thereby depriving women with U.S. citizenship of their right to vote solely because they resided in the unincorporated territory of Puerto Rico.¹⁰ The Insular Cases, issued by the Supreme Court of the United States in the early 20th century, addressed the constitutional status of territories acquired following the Spanish-American War of 1898, including Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam.¹¹ These decisions established a controversial framework under which the Constitution does not apply fully to all U.S. territories but instead only to those deemed “incorporated” and destined for statehood.¹² For “unincorporated territories,” such as Puerto Rico, the Court held that only certain fundamental constitutional rights would extend, leaving other rights subject to congressional discretion.¹³

The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico’s holding in Morales y Benet did more than reinforce the unequal application of constitutional rights allowed by the Insular Cases; the Court’s denial of suffrage to Puerto Rican women entrenched a deeper layer of exclusion that was uniquely shaped by Puerto Rico’s colonial status. While women in the mainland U.S. faced racial and economic barriers to voting even after the Nineteenth Amendment, Puerto Rican women were denied the very foundation of suffrage as a legal right, regardless of race or class.¹⁴ This left them in a state of triple disenfranchisement—excluded as women, as colonial subjects, and as residents of a territory without full constitutional protections. Puerto Rican women were relegated to a status even lower than their fellow male second-class citizens on the island—already deprived of full Congressional representation and presidential suffrage—by stripping them of a fundamental democratic right recognized elsewhere. In effect, the decision reduced these women to a “third-class” citizenship: not only denied the voting rights afforded to their mainland counterparts but also subjected to a localized form of patriarchal colonialism that suppressed their political agency within their own land.¹⁵ This ruling epitomized the intersection of colonial disenfranchisement and gender inequality, perpetuating a hierarchy that denied both political participation and dignity to a significant segment of American citizens.¹⁶

The centenary of Morales y Benet provides an opportunity to reflect on the inequalities women faced under Puerto Rican colonialism in the early 20th century, shaped by the legal imperialism of the United States over
the archipelago.¹⁷ This article explores the holding in Morales y Benet v.
La Junta Local de Inscripciones and its impact on women’s lives during the last 100 years.

The decision in Morales y Benet came at a time when women in the mainland United States had already secured the right to vote, following decades of suffrage activism that culminated in the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.¹⁸ However, Puerto Rico’s status as an unincorporated territory under U.S. sovereignty imposed a different legal framework on the island.¹⁹ The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, drawing on the Insular Cases concluded that the Nineteenth Amendment did not apply to Puerto Rico, leaving women on the island without the same constitutional protections enjoyed by their counterparts in the mainland.²⁰

As we reflect on the centennial of Morales y Benet, it becomes essential to examine the ways in which colonialism facilitated the exclusion of Puerto Rican women from the democratic process. This case serves as a lens through which we can explore how the intersection of gender and colonial status denied basic rights to U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico. By analyzing the legal reasoning behind this decision, we gain a deeper understanding of the broader implications of U.S. colonial rule and its impact on the fight for women’s suffrage in Puerto Rico.

I. The Insular Cases: Limits of The US Empire

The Insular Cases mark a pivotal moment in American constitutional history, as they defined the extent to which the U.S. Constitution applies to newly acquired territories and their inhabitants.²¹ Emerging in the wake of the Spanish-American War of 1898, these decisions reflect not only a judicial response to the geopolitical realities of an expanding U.S. empire, but also the racial, economic, and political considerations that shaped the governance of territories such as Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam.²² The cases introduced the concept of unincorporated territories, where full constitutional rights did not automatically apply, unless explicitly granted by Congress.²³ Through a fragmented and often contradictory reasoning, the Supreme Court established the doctrine of territorial incorporation, a legal framework that continues to influence the political and constitutional status of U.S. territories today.²⁴ This distinction between holding U.S. citizenship and enjoying the full constitutional rights granted to citizens in the states allowed the Puerto Rican court to deny women the right to vote, categorizing suffrage as a political right that could be regulated by local legislation.²⁵ As a result, the Insular Cases created a legal paradox in which American citizens residing in unincorporated territories, like Puerto Rico, could be denied fundamental rights and protections that their counterparts in the mainland automatically received by virtue of statehood.²⁶

In 1898, the Treaty of Paris formalized the United States’ acquisition of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, signaling the nation’s emergence as a global power.²⁷ However, this acquisition raised complex legal and constitutional questions: were the newly acquired territories part of the United States? If so, did the Constitution apply fully to their residents?²⁸ These questions were not merely theoretical; they carried significant economic and political implications.

The initial measures implemented by the U.S. military government in Puerto Rico revealed the United States’ primary focus on economic interests. The military government chose to preserve the Spanish fiscal framework already in place, allowing for the uninterrupted collection of taxes and tariffs.²⁹ As a result, the Dingley Tariff Act classified goods shipped from Puerto Rico to the United States—and vice versa—as foreign imports.³⁰ This created economic tensions that culminated in two landmark cases: Dooley v. United States and De Lima v. Bidwell.³¹ In Dooley, a taxpayer challenged the tariffs imposed on goods imported into Puerto Rico from New York, arguing that Puerto Rico’s change of sovereignty under the Treaty of Paris rendered such tariffs illegal.³² The Supreme Court agreed, ruling that Puerto Rico ceased to be a “foreign country” and could no longer impose duties on imports from the United States.³³

In De Lima, the Court addressed the reverse issue: the application of the Dingley Tariff to goods exported from Puerto Rico to the United States.³⁴ The Court ruled that Puerto Rico, having become a “domestic territory” under U.S. sovereignty, was exempt from the foreign tariffs imposed by the Dingley Act.³⁵ The Court’s reasoning hinged on the Treaty of Paris, which fundamentally altered Puerto Rico’s legal status.³⁶ While these decisions freed trade between Puerto Rico and the mainland, they did not resolve the larger constitutional question: Was Puerto Rico fully part of the United States? This ambiguity set the stage for the most consequential case of the era: Downes v. Bidwell.³⁷

The Supreme Court that decided Downes was the largely the same Court responsible for some of the most discredited decisions in U.S. history, including Plessy v. Ferguson and Lochner v. New York.³⁸ In Downes, the constitutionality of Section 3 of the Foraker Act, which imposed a small tariff barrier on trade between Puerto Rico and the United States, was at issue.³⁹ This provision required that goods exported between the two jurisdictions pay 15% of the duties applied to foreign products.⁴⁰ The plaintiff argued that this tariff violated the Uniformity Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which mandates that “. . . all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”⁴¹ The Court, therefore, had to answer a profound constitutional question: what constitutes the “United States” under the Constitution?

The Supreme Court ruled that constitutional provisions do not universally apply across U.S. territories.⁴² Justice Brown maintained that it was Congress’s prerogative to determine whether the Constitution extended to a conquered territory.⁴³ Justice White, whose reasoning the Court adopted in a later case, introduced the doctrine of territorial incorporation.⁴⁴ In his Downes concurrence, Justice White posited that whether a constitutional provision applied to a territory depended on whether Congress had incorporated that territory into the United States.⁴⁵

The dichotomy Justice White established, between “incorporated” and “unincorporated” territories, was of paramount importance. Incorporated territories, destined for statehood, were fully governed by the Constitution, whereas unincorporated territories were only entitled to “fundamental” constitutional rights.⁴⁶ While critics, including dissenting Justices Melville W. Fuller and John Marshall Harlan, rejected this distinction as lacking constitutional justification,⁴⁷ it became the defining framework for the Insular Cases.

Despite apparent differences in reasoning in their Downes opinions, Justices Brown and White were aligned in practice. Notably, neither justice dissented from the outcome of any Insular Case during their tenures.⁴⁸ Both approaches agreed that certain individual rights, identified as “fundamental,” extended wherever the U.S. flag flew.⁴⁹ However, the Court’s majority opinion in Downes left unresolved whether these rights derived directly from the Constitution or from extra-constitutional notions of natural law.

Justice White’s framework for incorporation relied on two key documents: the treaty through which the territory was acquired and subsequent congressional legislation.⁵⁰ While a treaty alone could not effectuate incorporation, congressional action, express or implicit, could confirm such intent.⁵¹ Conversely, a treaty could explicitly reject incorporation. Examining the 1898 Treaty of Paris, Justice White found language in Article IX that he interpreted as a clear denial of incorporation: “[t]he civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by Congress.”⁵²

This language contrasts with earlier territorial treaties, which generally stipulated that the inhabitants of ceded territories would be incorporated into the United States and, through such incorporation, granted the rights, privileges, and immunities of U.S. citizenship.⁵³ Nevertheless, this reasoning is not entirely sound. Article IX of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848) (predating the Insular Cases) similarly provided that Mexican citizens residing in the ceded territories “shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States, and be admitted at the proper time (to be judged of by the Congress of the United States) to the enjoyment of all the rights of citizens of the United States according to the principles of the Constitution”.⁵⁴ During the interim period, they were to “be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty and property, and secured in the free exercise of their religion without restriction.”⁵⁵

This language mirrors, in significant ways, the provisions of the Treaty of Paris. Under both treaties, Congress retained the discretion to determine the political rights and status of the inhabitants of the acquired territories.⁵⁶ Despite the deferral of immediate incorporation in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, California was swiftly integrated into the Union and never treated as an unincorporated territory.⁵⁷ This historical precedent raises a fundamental question: why should the same outcome not apply in the case of Puerto Rico, when the facts surrounding its acquisition are essentially analogous?

As Justice Marshall articulated in Loughborough v. Blake, the United States is “the name given to our great republic, which is composed of States and territories. The [D]istrict of Columbia, or the territory west of the Missouri, is not less within the United States, than Maryland or Pennsylvania.”⁵⁸ This understanding underscores the inconsistency in the reasoning adopted in the Insular Cases, which denied Puerto Rico’s automatic incorporation into the Union.⁵⁹

Justice White also cited the Foraker Act, which established the contested tariff.⁶⁰ He concluded that Section Three of the Act evidenced Congress’s intent not to incorporate Puerto Rico.⁶¹ This reasoning, however, was circular: Justice White justified Section Three’s constitutionality by pointing to its own existence as proof of congressional intent.⁶² In essence, the Court vested Congress with the discretion to determine which constitutional provisions applied to the territories, creating a flexible but inconsistent framework.⁶³

This congressional discretion, while providing flexibility, also deepened the uncertainty surrounding Puerto Rico’s constitutional status. The Court’s reliance on legislative intent created a framework where the rights of territorial inhabitants were contingent upon Congress’s shifting policies, rather than constitutional guarantees. This ambiguity set the stage for subsequent legislative actions, such as the Jones Act of 1917, which further complicated Puerto Rico’s relationship with the United States.

The Jones Act of 1917 unilaterally granted U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans, with the caveat that those who already held citizenship of another nation, or those who rejected U.S. citizenship, would effectively become foreigners in Puerto Rico.⁶⁴ Despite this opportunity, only a handful of individuals—288 to be exact—chose to renounce their citizenship.⁶⁵

The Supreme Court’s decision in Rassmussen v. United States, addressing whether Alaska had become an incorporated territory, further complicated the doctrine.⁶⁶ Justice White concluded that congressional actions, such as the granting of U.S. citizenship to its inhabitants, implied that the territory had been incorporated.⁶⁷ The treaty acquiring Alaska explicitly granted the inhabitants “the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of U.S. citizens.”⁶⁸ Justice White reasoned that these actions indicated incorporation, despite the absence of an express congressional statement to that effect.⁶⁹

Building on this precedent, the Jones Act’s conferral of citizenship revived a suggestion previously raised in Downes, and applied to Hawaii and Alaska. Namely, that granting U.S. citizenship to the inhabitants of a territory implicitly incorporated that territory into the United States.⁷⁰ This reasoning initially found support in two cases from Puerto Rico decided in 1917: one from the federal district court and another from the Puerto Rico Supreme Court.⁷¹ Both courts concluded that the grant of citizenship effectively incorporated Puerto Rico into the Union.⁷² However, the U.S. Supreme Court summarily reversed both decisions without issuing an opinion.⁷³

First, in In the Matter of Tapia, the Federal District Court of Puerto Rico concluded that Puerto Rico had become an incorporated territory, reasoning that the granting of U.S. citizenship and the establishment of an organized government signified incorporation.⁷⁴ The court held that incorporation and citizenship were synonymous, asserting that “there cannot be two kinds of Americans under a Republic.”⁷⁵

The Puerto Rican Supreme Court echoed this reasoning in Muratti v. Foote, concluding the combination of U.S. citizenship, organized government, and congressional actions implied that Puerto Rico had been incorporated.⁷⁶ The court noted that Puerto Rico’s status could not be different from that of Alaska, as both territories had received similar treatment regarding citizenship and governance.⁷⁷ Despite these conclusions, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed both Tapia and Muratti in a per curiam opinion, using the same precedents that had led the lower courts to conclude that Puerto Rico was incorporated.⁷⁸ This reversal left the legal status of Puerto Rico uncertain.

It would take five years for the Court to provide a rationale for these reversals in Balzac v. Porto Rico.⁷⁹ The identity of the author of the Balzac majority opinion is significant. Chief Justice Taft, the opinion’s author, had extensive experience with colonial governance, having previously served as president of the commission that ruled the Philippines, as Secretary of War, and as President of the United States.⁸⁰ Justice Taft’s prior statements while serving in these roles reflected his skepticism regarding the ability of Filipinos and Puerto Ricans to self-govern.⁸¹ His involvement in Puerto Rico’s governance also included a notable episode in 1909, when the Puerto Rican House of Delegates refused to approve a budget, prompting then-President Taft to deliver a paternalistic message to Congress arguing that Puerto Ricans had been granted too much self-governance.⁸² Taft’s message expressed concern that,

[t]his spirit, which has been growing from year to year in Porto Rico, shows that too great power has been vested in the house of delegates and that its members are not sufficiently alive to their oath-taken responsibility, for the maintenance of the government, to justify Congress in further reposing in them absolute power to withhold appropriations necessary for the government’s life.⁸³

President Taft’s arguments led Congress to enact the Olmsted Act of 1909, which mandated the continuation of the prior year’s budget if no new budget was approved,⁸⁴ depriving Puerto Rico of an important tool of resistance against U.S. imperialism.

In Balzac, the case involved a criminal libel charge against the editor of a newspaper in Arecibo for publications critical of Governor Yager.⁸⁵ The defendant was convicted and sentenced to nine months in prison.⁸⁶ Balzac argued that he was entitled to a trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment and claimed protection for his speech under the First Amendment and the Bill of Rights included in the Jones Act.⁸⁷ Both the Puerto Rico Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected these claims.⁸⁸

The Puerto Rico Supreme Court dismissed the jury trial claim, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1917 summary reversals.⁸⁹ The court emphasized that local law only recognized the right to a jury trial for serious crimes—not for lesser offenses such as criminal libel.⁹⁰ The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Sixth Amendment did not apply to Puerto Rico because it remained an unincorporated territory.⁹¹

In reaching this conclusion, Justice Taft categorically rejected the argument that the grant of U.S. citizenship had incorporated Puerto Rico into the Union asserting that if Congress had intended incorporation, it would have done so explicitly rather than leaving it to inference.⁹² Echoing the Court’s reasoning in Downes, Justice Taft concluded that incorporation should not be presumed without an express declaration by Congress or a strong implication that excludes any other idea.⁹³ He further noted that the Jones Act’s Bill of Rights for Puerto Rico did not include the right to a jury trial, which, in his view, underscored Congress’s lack of intent to incorporate the territory.⁹⁴

Justice Taft’s reasoning reflects a patronizing view of the capacity of Puerto Ricans for self-government, as well as a dismissal of the broader implications of U.S. citizenship. According to Justice Taft, the citizenship conferred in 1917 merely allowed Puerto Ricans to migrate to the mainland United States, where they could enjoy the full rights of American citizenship—an option not made available to Filipinos without naturalization.⁹⁵ Justice Taft’s assertion, however, conveniently ignored the Court’s earlier holding in Gonzales v. Williams, which had already determined that Puerto Ricans were not considered “foreigners” for purposes of immigration.⁹⁶

To distinguish Puerto Rico from territories like Alaska and Hawaii, where the grant of citizenship signaled incorporation, Justice Taft cited geographic and demographic considerations. He argued that Alaska, for instance, was a vast, sparsely populated land that offered opportunities for settlement by American citizens and was geographically accessible from the mainland.⁹⁷ By contrast, Puerto Rico, according to Justice Taft, presented challenges due to its distinct origins, language, and population density—factors that precluded its incorporation into the Union.⁹⁸

Justice Taft’s opinion reflected a deeper racial and colonial bias.⁹⁹ He argued that incorporation should not be inferred lightly, particularly for “distant ocean communities of a different origin and language.”¹⁰⁰ Balzac also emphasized the supposed unsuitability of Puerto Ricans for the jury system, a justification rooted in notions of cultural superiority.¹⁰¹ He claimed that jury trials required citizens who had been “trained to the exercise of the responsibilities” through centuries of tradition, and that such impartiality could not be expected from people unfamiliar with Anglo-American governance.¹⁰² Justice Taft concluded with a passage dripping with condescension, asserting that the U.S. had been generous in extending constitutional protections to Puerto Rico but had been careful not to impose the jury system “until they desired it”.¹⁰³ The irony is striking: since 1900, criminal defendants in Puerto Rico’s U.S. District Court have enjoyed the fundamental right to a jury trial, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.¹⁰⁴

The final blow came when Justice Taft addressed the connection between citizenship and incorporation. He unequivocally stated that incorporation was a significant step toward statehood and required Congress to make a clear and explicit declaration that a territory was to be fully incorporated.¹⁰⁵ By doing so, Justice Taft effectively foreclosed the possibility of implicit incorporation, a ruling that has continued to shape Puerto Rico’s constitutional and political status.

Despite the lack of constitutional foundation for this distinction, the U.S. Supreme Court, through the Insular Cases, established a system where only incorporated territories could be admitted as states, while unincorporated territories could remain in a legal limbo.¹⁰⁶ Balzac has come to symbolize the legal imperialism of the Insular Cases.¹⁰⁷ By holding that Puerto Rico remained an unincorporated territory despite the granting of U.S. citizenship to its inhabitants, the decision in Balzac effectively solidified the doctrine of unincorporated territories, where U.S. citizenship did not automatically confer full constitutional protections.¹⁰⁸ The practical effect of the decision was to allow the United States to maintain territories like Puerto Rico in a state of political limbo, where they were governed by U.S. law but not granted the full rights of statehood. This legal framework allowed the U.S. government to apply constitutional rights selectively to unincorporated territories. Fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech and due process, applied to Puerto Rico, but political rights, such as the right to vote, could be, and were, denied.¹⁰⁹

In retrospect, Balzac marked the culmination of the Court’s efforts to reconcile the contradictions inherent in the Insular Cases. While subsequent decisions have acknowledged the outdated and problematic nature of the Insular Cases, their reasoning remains intact.¹¹⁰ A series of post-Balzac cases illustrates the enduring legacy of the Insular Cases and their profound influence on Puerto Rico’s legal and political framework.¹¹¹ The selective application of constitutional rights has left Puerto Rico in a state of colonial subordination, where its people are governed by U.S. law but without the full benefits of statehood.¹¹² The path forward requires a reevaluation of the Insular Cases and their continued relevance in U.S. territorial law. Legal scholars and activists have long called for the overturning of these cases, arguing that they represent a relic of a colonial past that has no place in contemporary constitutional law.¹¹³

II. Morales y Benet v. La Junta Local de Inscripciones

A. Historical Context of the Passage of the Jones Act

The broader historical context of Puerto Rican women’s suffrage reveals that efforts to secure the vote for women began well before the landmark case of Morales y Benet.¹¹⁴ One key event in this struggle occurred during the U.S. legislative debates over the Jones Act of 1917, which redefined the political status of Puerto Rico and its inhabitants.¹¹⁵ The Act granted U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans, but failed to extend full political rights, specifically the right to vote, to women.¹¹⁶

Illinois Congressman James R. Mann introduced an amendment to the Jones Act that sought to extend suffrage to Puerto Rican women ahead of the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in the mainland United States.¹¹⁷ This proposal was a critical opportunity to advance women’s rights on the island; however, the Mann Amendment ultimately failed to pass.¹¹⁸ This failure highlights the complexities of colonial governance and underscores the U.S. Congress’s ambivalence toward extending full political rights to its territorial possessions.

The debate over Section 35 of the Jones Act was particularly contentious.¹¹⁹ The original Section 35 stipulated,

[t]hat the qualified electors of Porto Rico, for any election whatsoever, shall consist of those citizens that will be hereafter registered in accordance with the terms of this act and of the laws of Porto Rico hereafter enacted. That no person shall be allowed to register as a voter or to vote in Porto Rico who is not a citizen of the United States, over 21 years of age, and who is not able to read and write, or who is not a bona fide taxpayer in his own name in an amount of not less than $3 per annum.¹²⁰

The revised Section 35, proposed by Representatives William Jones and Horace Towner, included a significant change, adding the word “male” to specify that only men could vote.¹²¹ This revision further restricted suffrage and reflected the entrenched gender bias within U.S. colonial governance. Congressman Mann sought to strike the word “male” and introduce gender-neutral language, proposing that suffrage be extended “without regard to sex.”¹²² This gender-neutral language effectively granted women the right to vote by removing the explicit restriction to men. Although Mann’s motion passed, lawmakers retained the literacy and property qualifications during the subsequent debate.¹²³ In the end, Congress rejected the revised Section 35, including the woman-suffrage provision.¹²⁴ This defeat prevented Puerto Rican women from gaining suffrage alongside their mainland counterparts and highlighted the inconsistent application of democratic principles in U.S. territories.

The failure of the Mann Amendment underscores the deep tensions between the ideals of democracy espoused by the United States and the practical application of those ideals in its territorial possessions. During the Congressional debates on the Jones Act, several arguments against extending suffrage to Puerto Rican women revealed the condescending and exclusionary attitudes of lawmakers.¹²⁵ Representative Jones, the proponent of the broader measure, dismissed the amendment as unnecessary, claiming that “no single human soul, male or female, in Porto Rico [was] demanding equal suffrage.”¹²⁶ This statement erased the activism of Puerto Rican women who had, in fact, been advocating for their political rights.¹²⁷ It also exemplified the colonialist assumption that the U.S. Congress could define and interpret the political desires of its territorial subjects. By disregarding existing suffrage efforts, Representative Jones rationalized the continued exclusion of women under the guise of representing the will of the governed.¹²⁸ These flawed and dismissive arguments became part of the official Congressional Record, reflecting the rhetorical strategies used to justify the denial of women’s suffrage in Puerto Rico.

Opponents of the amendment framed their arguments around notions of readiness and propriety, effectively silencing any dissenting voices from Puerto Rico itself.¹²⁹ Representative Huddleston critiqued this approach, arguing that it was fundamentally “undemocratic” and “un-American” for Congress to dictate the qualifications for voting in Puerto Rico while ignoring the principles of local self-governance and consent of the governed.¹³⁰ This way of thinking is emblematic of colonial governance where the colonizer presumes superior knowledge and authority over the colonized.¹³¹ The justification for withholding suffrage was not grounded in evidence of incapacity or lack of political engagement, but in a desire to maintain control and reinforce hierarchical structures.¹³²

B. The Nineteenth Amendment and its Impact on Puerto Rico

In the early months of 1919, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Nineteenth Amendment with a decisive vote of 304 to 90, followed by the Senate’s approval with a margin of 56 to 25.¹³³ On
August 18, 1920, Tennessee appeared to secure the amendment’s ratification—an outcome dramatically sealed by 24-year-old legislator Harry Burn, whose last-minute change of vote was spurred by his mother’s insistence.¹³⁴ However, opponents of the Amendment were determined to delay its formal ratification.¹³⁵ Anti-suffrage legislators fled the state to prevent a quorum, while their allies organized mass demonstrations and sought to persuade pro-suffrage legislators to reverse their stance.¹³⁶ Despite these efforts, Tennessee reaffirmed its vote, delivering the decisive thirty-sixth vote required for ratification, leading to the Amendment’s adoption and marking a monumental victory for the women’s suffrage movement in the United States.¹³⁷

It was not until 1929, over a decade after the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, that the Puerto Rican legislature finally enacted women’s suffrage, albeit with significant literacy restrictions.¹³⁸ These restrictions were particularly impactful given Puerto Rico’s high illiteracy rates at the time; in 1930, the illiteracy rate on the island was 41.4%.¹³⁹ These qualifications exemplified the selective application of constitutional principles to U.S. territories and reinforced Puerto Rico’s subordinate status within the broader American legal framework. The delay in granting full voting rights to Puerto Rican women, compared to their counterparts on the mainland, further entrenched the island’s colonial status and gender-based discrimination.

While the Jones Act granted U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans, it failed to extend voting rights to women, sparking organized efforts for suffrage.¹⁴⁰ Ultimately, Section 35 of the Jones Act articulated the following provisions regarding voter eligibility:

[t]hat at the first election held pursuant to this Act the qualified electors shall be those having the qualifications of voters under the present law. Thereafter voters shall be citizens of the United States twenty-one years of age or over and have such additional qualifications as may be prescribed by the legislature of Porto Rico: Provided, That no property qualification shall ever be imposed upon or required of any voter.¹⁴¹

The Liga Femínea Puertorriqueña emerged as a critical voice in this movement, directly challenging the limitations imposed by both local and federal laws.¹⁴² This marked the beginning of an organized feminist movement that not only sought voting rights but also aimed to dismantle broader structures of inequality rooted in the island’s colonial relationship with the United States.¹⁴³

C. The Fight for Women’s Suffrage in Puerto Rico After
the Nineteenth Amendment

Puerto Rican suffragist leaders argued that the Jones Act explicitly granted voting rights to U.S. citizens over the age of 21, including women.¹⁴⁴ However, the existing electoral law of 1903, which restricted voting to male citizens, presented a significant barrier.¹⁴⁵ The suffragists attributed the failure to amend the law to the anti-feminist attitudes of local politicians, who they saw as responsible for denying Puerto Rican women the right to vote, despite their U.S. citizenship.¹⁴⁶ Milagros Benet de Mewton, a prominent member of the League and sister of Republican Party delegate José Benet, was among those advocating for women’s suffrage.¹⁴⁷

The legal and political struggle for women’s suffrage unfolded on multiple fronts, both in the courts and in the legislature. This dynamic tension became particularly evident in the court case of Morales y Benet, where Puerto Rican women directly challenged the colonial legal system.¹⁴⁸ That same year, Representative Pedro María Descartes introduced H.B. 41, a bill to grant suffrage to Puerto Rican women, in the House of Representatives of Puerto Rico.¹⁴⁹ The bill declared women “apt to exercise the elective right” but required literacy while waiving property qualifications.¹⁵⁰ This measure fell short, however, of full equality because it denied illiterate women the right to vote, even if they owned property—a right that illiterate men continued to enjoy by virtue of their land ownership.¹⁵¹ The proposal ultimately failed to gain traction, reflecting a restrictive view of “universal suffrage” that remained limited to men.¹⁵²

In 1909, Representative Nemesio Canales introduced another suffrage bill, but it faced vehement opposition from Cámara president José de Diego.¹⁵³ De Diego argued that granting women the vote would strip them of their virtuous roles as mothers and wives, reducing them to participants in the “virile passions” of politics.¹⁵⁴ His rhetoric prevailed, and the proposal was indefinitely postponed.¹⁵⁵

Ironically, during the debates surrounding the Jones Act in 1916, U.S. Representative William Jones claimed that there was “not a single human soul, male or female, in Porto Rico demanding equal suffrage”.¹⁵⁶ This assertion starkly contrasts with the Puerto Rican legislative record, which reveals that suffrage bills had been proposed as early as 1900, demonstrating that the demand for women’s political rights had existed for decades prior to his statement.¹⁵⁷

The suffragist leaders pointed out that the resistance to women’s suffrage from the local politicians was to blame for the failure to amend the electoral law to grant Puerto Rican women, as U.S. citizens, the right to vote.¹⁵⁸ This interpretation relied on the plain language of Article 35 of the Jones Act, which conferred U.S. citizenship on all Puerto Ricans without any distinction based on gender.¹⁵⁹ Since the Act did not explicitly exclude women, they were entitled to the same political rights as men, including the right to vote. However, the absence of specific language guaranteeing women’s suffrage left room for political maneuvering by local legislators, who resisted amending electoral laws to reflect the principles of equal citizenship.¹⁶⁰

This argument underscored how local resistance perpetuated gender-based disenfranchisement, reinforcing the broader pattern of selective application of democratic principles in the territories. Ultimately, the suffragists’ legal reasoning highlighted the dissonance between the theoretical rights conferred by U.S. citizenship and the practical realities of political exclusion in Puerto Rico.

In May 1919, when Representative Towner led a congressional delegation visit to Puerto Rico, the president of the Ponce chapter of the Liga Femínea, Dr. Dolores Pérez Marchand, sent a telegram requesting the extension of suffrage to Puerto Rican women as soon as it was granted to American women.¹⁶¹ Similarly, letters were sent to the Bureau of Insular Affairs (BIA) in Washington, requesting a stance on women’s suffrage that was favorable to Puerto Rican women.¹⁶² The BIA was the federal agency responsible for overseeing the administration of U.S. territories.¹⁶³

In 1921, the Liga Femínea changed its name to the Liga Social Sufragista de Puerto Rico (Social Suffragist League of Puerto Rico, or LSS).¹⁶⁴ Beyond the right to vote, the LSS sought to achieve civil and political equality between men and women through legislation that would equalize their legal standing, specifically in the political sphere.¹⁶⁵ They pursued the right for women to be elected to legislative seats and other public offices.¹⁶⁶ These new goals reflected the evolving nature of the Puerto Rican women’s suffrage movement, which aimed not only to secure the right to vote but also to achieve broader gender equality in the political arena.

An important yet often overlooked attempt to achieve suffrage for Puerto Rican women came from Genara Pagán, a prominent labor leader in the early 20th century.¹⁶⁷ Pagán’s activism extended beyond women’s rights, as she played a central role in the 1914 cigar workers’ strike in Puerto Rico.¹⁶⁸ After the strike, Pagán emigrated to New York City, where she found employment in a blouse factory and maintained strong ties with Puerto Rican tobacco unions in the city.¹⁶⁹ These unions had established a strong presence in New York, and their continued communication with the union Federación Libre de Trabajadores in Puerto Rico enabled Pagán to stay well-informed about the ongoing labor struggles on the island.¹⁷⁰ Her activism in New York illustrates how labor movements and women’s rights advocacy were deeply intertwined, both in Puerto Rico and within the broader Puerto Rican diaspora.

When the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified in 1920, extending suffrage to women across the United States, Pagán returned to Puerto Rico and attempted to register to vote.¹⁷¹ Her argument rested on the fact that Puerto Rican women, as U.S. citizens under the Jones Act of 1917, were entitled to the protections and rights conferred by the Nineteenth Amendment.¹⁷² The Local Registration Board, however, rejected her registration application, contending the Nineteenth Amendment did not apply to Puerto Rico.¹⁷³ This rejection prompted Puerto Rican Governor, Arthur Yager, to seek clarification from the BIA in Washington, D.C.¹⁷⁴ In a memorandum dated September 7, 1920, from General James McIntyre, Chief of the BIA, to Judge Advocate General E. H. Crowder, the BIA concluded the U.S. Constitution applied only to states and organized territories, excluding Puerto Rico under the doctrine of unincorporated territories established by the Insular Cases.¹⁷⁵ As Puerto Rico was considered an unincorporated territory, the Nineteenth Amendment and the right to vote for women, did not extend to the island.¹⁷⁶

Crowder contended that, because the Constitution had never been fully extended to Puerto Rico, the governance of dependent U.S. territories should adhere to the principle that the Constitution does not apply in its entirety to such territories.¹⁷⁷ Clark also noted that in January 1921, Ida Husted Harper, a prominent figure in the U.S. women’s suffrage movement, asked Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby about the difference between Alaska, “our former territories,” and Puerto Rico concerning women’s suffrage.¹⁷⁸ Relying on the Insular Cases, the BIA responded that, unlike Alaska and Hawaii, which were incorporated territories, Puerto Rico was not incorporated; therefore, the Constitution did not fully govern the island.¹⁷⁹

The BIA’s ruling starkly exposed the inherent contradictions and profound limitations of U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans, particularly women. This ruling not only stripped Puerto Rican women of their political rights but also served as a stark reminder that U.S. citizenship in unincorporated territories was inherently second-class. Pagán’s case, though ultimately unsuccessful, illuminated the deep systemic barriers faced by Puerto Rican women in their fight for equality and political recognition. Her efforts, while thwarted by a legal system designed to maintain colonial subjugation, foreshadowed the struggles in Morales y Benet, where the Puerto Rican Supreme Court would continue to grapple, often unsuccessfully, with the discriminatory framework imposed by the island’s unincorporated status.¹⁸⁰ Despite these obstacles, Pagán’s resilience stands as a testament to the unwavering determination of Puerto Rican women activists who, even in the face of institutionalized oppression, continued to challenge the inequities of U.S. colonial rule and assert their rightful place as full citizens.

In this historical context, Milagros Benet de Mewton’s legal battle against the Junta Local de Inscripciones was a pivotal moment in Puerto Rico’s suffrage movement.¹⁸¹ Similar to other efforts by Puerto Rican women’s suffragists, her argument was based on the assertion that the Jones Act of 1917 had granted U.S. citizenship to all Puerto Ricans, and thus, women should have the right to vote as U.S. citizens.¹⁸² Benet de Mewton challenged a local electoral law which restricted voting rights to men, arguing the discriminatory law violated the constitutional rights of Puerto Rican citizens’ constitutional rights.¹⁸³

D. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico’s Opinion in Morales y Benet

In Morales y Benet v. La Junta Local de Inscripciones, a petition for mandamus was filed with the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico on March 24, 1924, by Mariana Morales Bernard.¹⁸⁴ The petition alleged that Morales Bernard, a U.S. citizen and native of Puerto Rico, was over 21 years old, a resident of San Juan, and a cigar maker by trade.¹⁸⁵ She had always lived in Puerto Rico and, for more than a year, had been domiciled in the Puerta de Tierra neighborhood of San Juan.¹⁸⁶ Furthermore, she had never been convicted of a felony or electoral offense, was not institutionalized in any public or private facility, was not under a guardian’s care, and did not depend on public or private charity.¹⁸⁷ Thus, Morales Bernard met all the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory requirements to register and vote in the 1924 general elections.¹⁸⁸ Despite this, she was denied registration solely due to her gender.¹⁸⁹ The petitioner argued that this denial was unlawful, particularly in light of the addition of the Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits denying the right to vote based on sex.¹⁹⁰

After the petition was filed, the court scheduled a hearing for the afternoon of March 31, allowing Morales Bernard, represented by Bolívar Pagán, and the Attorney General, representing the Local Board of Registration and Elections of San Juan, to present their arguments.¹⁹¹ Meanwhile, a similar petition was filed by Milagros Benet de Mewton for similar reasons.¹⁹² Cayetano Coll y Cuchí, on behalf of LSS, requested to be heard as amicus curiae.¹⁹³ The court adopted the same resolution for Benet de Mewton’s petition as Morales Bernard, denying her registration based on her sex.¹⁹⁴ On March 31, both petitioners appeared, and both were represented by attorney Bolívar Pagán,¹⁹⁵ with amicus curiae represented by attorney Cayetano Coll y Cuchí.¹⁹⁶

The challenged law explicitly restricted voting rights to men.¹⁹⁷ The central legal issue was whether a woman, who satisfied all other legal requirements, had the right to vote under Puerto Rican law at that time.¹⁹⁸ The court examined this restriction in the context of the 1917 Organic Act (Jones Act), which granted the Puerto Rican Legislature the authority to establish voter qualifications, with the only federal requirements being U.S. citizenship, a minimum age, and the prohibition of property-based voting restrictions.¹⁹⁹

The petitioners contended that the Nineteenth Amendment should apply to Puerto Rico, making the local law unconstitutional.²⁰⁰ However, the Court, drawing on the Insular Cases, and particularly the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Balzac,²⁰¹ held that the Nineteenth Amendment did not automatically extend to Puerto Rico because it was an unincorporated territory.²⁰² The Court emphasized that the right to vote was not considered a “fundamental personal right” like freedom of speech or due process, which would apply universally.²⁰³ Instead, it was deemed a “political right” that could be regulated by Congress or local legislation without constitutional constraints.²⁰⁴

The court also reviewed legislative history, noting that although an amendment to include women in the electorate was proposed during discussions of the Jones Act, it was not adopted.²⁰⁵ This indicated that

Congress did not intend for women to vote in Puerto Rico at that time.²⁰⁶ Furthermore, the court cited the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories established in the Insular Cases,²⁰⁷ arguing that Puerto Rico, as an unincorporated territory, did not automatically receive the full benefits of constitutional amendments like incorporated territories did, unless explicitly extended by Congress.²⁰⁸

The court ultimately concluded that since the Nineteenth Amendment did not apply to Puerto Rico, and the local law explicitly restricted voting to men, the petitioners had no legal right to vote under the existing legal framework.²⁰⁹ As a result, the petition for mandamus was denied, and the exclusion of women from the electoral process in Puerto Rico was upheld, reflecting the broader legal and political status of the territory as a non-incorporated entity under U.S. sovereignty.²¹⁰

III. The Insular Cases and Their Role in Denying Suffrage

Building upon the precedent set by the Insular Cases, Morales y Benet exemplified how these decisions were weaponized to deny fundamental rights. By examining this case, we can better understand how colonial legal doctrines shaped Puerto Rican women’s exclusion from suffrage.²¹¹ Early 20th-century Supreme Court rulings legitimized unequal treatment of U.S. territories. This framework permitted the selective extension of certain constitutional rights to the territories while withholding others.²¹²

In the case of Puerto Rico, the Insular Cases established the precedent for the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico to deny the application of specific constitutional rights, including women’s suffrage, by claiming that these rights were not automatically granted to unincorporated territories.²¹³ It is important to note, however, that fundamental rights, like freedom of speech, did apply fully in Puerto Rico because they were considered essential to all U.S. citizens, regardless of their territorial status.²¹⁴ By contrast, political rights, such as the right to vote, were left up to each territory.²¹⁵ This selective application of rights was central to the ruling in Morales y Benet, where the court used the Insular Cases to deny Puerto Rican women the right to vote, even though they were U.S. citizens.²¹⁶

The selective application of rights reflects the colonial logic embedded in U.S. governance of Puerto Rico, reinforcing the notion that the inhabitants of the territory were politically underdeveloped and unfit for self-governance. This differentiation rested on paternalistic assumptions that Puerto Ricans, as colonial subjects, required oversight and gradual political integration rather than immediate enfranchisement.²¹⁷ Such attitudes perpetuated a hierarchical relationship in which fundamental rights were extended as markers of basic citizenship, while political rights—viewed as privileges tied to democratic maturity—remained contingent and discretionary. This colonial framework was pivotal in the ruling of Morales y Benet, where the court, relying on the precedent set by the Insular Cases, denied Puerto Rican women the right to vote despite their U.S. citizenship, further entrenching the perception of Puerto Rico’s subordinate status within the American legal and political order.

This framework played a pivotal role in the 1924 case of Morales y Benet, where the Puerto Rican Supreme Court determined that the Nineteenth Amendment, which extended suffrage to women in the mainland United States, did not apply to women in Puerto Rico.²¹⁸ Moreover, this legal struggle was paralleled by a deep internal division within the suffrage movement in Puerto Rico, particularly within the LSS, which further complicated efforts to secure voting rights for women.²¹⁹ As discussed in the following sections, these internal conflicts significantly influenced the broader fight for suffrage in Puerto Rico.

The court’s ruling reflected broader colonial and gendered inequalities and relied on the legal reasoning of the Insular Cases to deny women their political rights.²²⁰ The Puerto Rico Supreme Court’s decision to deny suffrage to women rested on a flawed interpretation of the constitutional doctrine of incorporation. The court argued that the Nineteenth Amendment did not apply to Puerto Rico because the island was an unincorporated territory.²²¹

The Nineteenth Amendment’s language is clear and unequivocal: “[T]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex.”²²² Nowhere does the Amendment suggest that this right is limited to U.S. citizens residing in the US. The Amendment speaks to the rights of all U.S. citizens, without geographic limitations. By denying Puerto Rican women the right to vote, the court effectively nullified the meaning of U.S. citizenship for these women, creating a distinction between citizens based on their place of residence.

This convergence of colonialism and patriarchy not only denied Puerto Rican women their rights but also reinforced a broader system of exclusion that marginalized women within colonial territories. By analyzing the legal reasoning behind Morales y Benet, we uncover the layered oppressions that defined this era.²²³ The Insular Cases themselves were rooted in a colonial logic that sought to justify the subordination of territories like Puerto Rico, treating their inhabitants as inferior and undeserving of full constitutional rights.²²⁴ The court, by invoking this logic, reinforced the colonial status of Puerto Rico and the exclusion of its people from full participation in the democratic process.

As we reflect on the legal and historical significance of Morales y Benet, it becomes clear that this case is not just a relic of the past. Instead, it serves as a reminder of the ongoing struggles for equality in U.S. territories and the urgent need to address the enduring legacies of the Insular Cases. The exclusion of women from suffrage in Puerto Rico was not an isolated incident, but part of a broader pattern of gender discrimination that sought to limit women’s roles to the private sphere.²²⁵ The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico’s reliance on the Insular Cases to justify this exclusion of women from the political process, specifically their right to vote, served only to entrench the intersection of colonial and gender-based oppression, denying Puerto Rican women both political and personal autonomy.²²⁶

The Morales y Benet decision represents a historical wrong. The continued reliance on the Insular Cases to justify the unequal treatment of Puerto Rico and its people is not only constitutionally indefensible, but also morally reprehensible. The right to vote is fundamental to democratic governance, and the exclusion of Puerto Rican women from this right in 1924 was a grave injustice that must be acknowledged.²²⁷

From a legal perspective, the decision in Morales y Benet represents a departure from the ideals of equality and justice espoused by the U.S. Constitution, even if those ideals have not always been fully realized in practice. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court had the opportunity to extend the Nineteenth Amendment to Puerto Rican women by recognizing their U.S. citizenship as the basis for granting them the fundamental right to vote, regardless of Puerto Rico’s status as an unincorporated territory.²²⁸ Instead, it chose to defer to a colonial legal framework that denied these women their rightful place in the political process.²²⁹

Historically, women’s suffrage was seen as a key civil right that intersected with other fundamental rights.²³⁰ Property-based voting rights were initially justified under the assumption that only those who had a “stake in the community” could vote.²³¹ This was later changed in favor of broader suffrage rights when citizenship became the foundation for voting.²³² When the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico used the Insular Cases to deny women the right to vote, it disregarded this evolution in democratic principles and the broader movement toward equality, which had culminated in the Nineteenth Amendment.²³³ By excluding Puerto Rican women from the suffrage movement, the court reinforced colonial ideologies that subordinated Puerto Ricans, particularly women, to third-class status.²³⁴

From a feminist and anticolonial perspective, the decision in Morales y Benet cannot be separated from the broader colonial history of Puerto Rico. The denial of suffrage was not just about gender—it was also deeply tied

to the racial and cultural prejudices that informed the Insular Cases. As the U.S. expanded its imperial reach, the people in its new territories, particularly those of non-white, non-English-speaking populations, were deemed unfit for full constitutional protections, including voting rights.²³⁵ This racialized logic was evident in Chief Justice Taft’s opinion in Balzac, where he argued that distant territories with different “origin and language” should not be incorporated into the United States.²³⁶ By using this reasoning in Morales y Benet, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court upheld the colonial subordination of its people and maintained the exclusion of women from political life.

The denial of suffrage to Puerto Rican women also reflects broader patterns of resistance to gender equality. The women’s suffrage movement in the U.S. faced numerous obstacles.²³⁷ This included figures like Lucretia Mott dismissing women’s political rights as “ridiculous”²³⁸ and legal barriers being imposed by cases such as Minor v. Happersett, which held that citizenship alone did not confer voting rights.²³⁹ However, Puerto Rican women faced the additional hurdle of colonialism.²⁴⁰ In this context, the court’s decision in Morales y Benet was a double injustice: it denied women their right to vote and perpetuated their subordination as colonial subjects.

The eventual ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment marked a significant legal victory, formally guaranteeing women’s right to vote across the United States.²⁴¹ However, this achievement primarily benefited white women, while many women of color—both on the mainland and in U.S. territories like Puerto Rico—continued to face barriers to full suffrage.²⁴² Although women of color played crucial roles in the suffrage movement, systemic racism and colonial governance structures limited the practical extension of voting rights.²⁴³ This disparity highlights the incomplete nature of the U.S. suffrage movement, which, despite securing formal enfranchisement, did not fully dismantle the legal and political obstacles that perpetuated exclusion for marginalized women.²⁴⁴

The Puerto Rico Supreme Court’s decision in Morales y Benet illustrates how deeply colonial ideology has influenced legal doctrine. Rather than seizing the opportunity to uphold the promise of gender equality enshrined in the Nineteenth Amendment, the court relied on outdated precedents like the Insular Cases, frameworks designed to limit constitutional rights in territories, to justify denying suffrage to Puerto Rican women.²⁴⁵ This decision perpetuates systemic exclusion and exposes the fragility of constitutional protections when viewed through a colonial lens.²⁴⁶

Notably, the ruling highlights a broader failure to address the intersectionality of gender and colonial oppression. Puerto Rican women were doubly disenfranchised—not only as women within a patriarchal system but also as individuals living under the constraints of an unincorporated territory. The court’s approach failed to account for how these overlapping injustices compounded their exclusion, further marginalizing them in the larger narrative of U.S. democracy.

The fight for voting rights in Puerto Rico, as in the mainland United States, was deeply intertwined with struggles for gender equality and self-determination.²⁴⁷ The Morales y Benet decision serves as a reminder of the ways in which legal institutions can be complicit in systems of oppression, and it calls for continued vigilance in the fight for justice and equality. This decision, shaped by colonialism and patriarchy, must be critically examined and its legacy dismantled in the pursuit of justice for Puerto Rican women and all those who have been marginalized by the colonial legal framework.²⁴⁸

In other words, the ruling in Morales y Benet stands as a stark injustice, cementing the exclusion of Puerto Rican women from a fundamental democratic right. By weaponizing the Insular Cases, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court not only denied women the protections afforded by the Nineteenth Amendment but also perpetuated the colonial subjugation of Puerto Rico itself. The decision was a betrayal of the very essence of U.S. citizenship, treating Puerto Rican women as third-class citizens whose right to vote was dismissed as a mere “political right” that could be regulated away by local legislation. In a moment when the court could have upheld the principles of equality and justice, it chose instead to deepen the scars of colonialism, using flawed constitutional logic to justify the disenfranchisement of half the population.

This decision did more than deny women the right to vote—it reinforced a patriarchal and colonial system that sought to silence and marginalize Puerto Rican voices.²⁴⁹ It was a brutal reminder that U.S. citizenship, when granted to those in its territories, was an empty promise, riddled with selective protections and exclusions.²⁵⁰ Puerto Rican women were forced to fight not only against gender oppression but also the weight of a colonial legal framework that deemed them unworthy of full participation in the democratic process. The Morales y Benet decision is a chilling testament to the lengths colonial powers will go to maintain control, sacrificing justice and equality in the process.

IV. The Consequences of Morales y Benet v. La Junta
Local de Inscripciones

A. Fragmentation and Political Division Within the Suffrage Movement

The denial of Benet de Mewton’s petition in 1924 did not mark the end of the suffrage movement in Puerto Rico, but it did expose deep divisions within the movement itself, particularly within the LSS. The LSS was the leading organization advocating for women’s voting rights in Puerto Rico, but Benet de Mewton’s decision to file a mandamus, without official authorization from the LSS’s leadership, sparked controversy.²⁵¹ Some members of the organization viewed her actions as unilateral and unauthorized, creating tensions within the group.²⁵² These tensions culminated in a conflict between Benet de Mewton and Antonio R. Barceló, the president of the Puerto Rican Senate.²⁵³ Benet de Mewton alleged that when she and a commission of suffragists met with Barceló to advocate for women’s suffrage, he insulted them with obscenities (an accusation that Barceló denied).²⁵⁴

This conflict divided the LSS into two factions.²⁵⁵ One faction, led by Benet de Mewton and Ángela Caldas de Miró, supported a more assertive approach to securing women’s voting rights.²⁵⁶ The other faction, led by LSS president Rosario Bellber and Isabel Andreu de Aguilar, took a more cautious stance by not actively promoting litigation as a strategy for securing women’s voting rights.²⁵⁷ The internal conflict within the LSS came to a head in August 1924, when the organization held an extraordinary general assembly to address the growing crisis.²⁵⁸

Beneath these personal conflicts lay deeper political divisions. The suffragists within the LSS were not a homogenous group, and their political affiliations influenced their approaches to the suffrage movement.²⁵⁹ As writer María de Fátima Barceló Miller has written, many of the suffragists who remained loyal to the LSS were aligned with the Republican Party and the Republican-Socialist Coalition.²⁶⁰ The dissidents who left the LSS to form a new organization, the Asociación Puertorriqueña de Mujeres Sufragistas, were aligned with the Unión Party and the Republican-Unionist Alliance.²⁶¹ This political alignment influenced the goals and strategies of each faction, with the LSS officially advocating for universal suffrage, while many of its leaders privately supported restricted suffrage based on literacy.²⁶²

B. The Role of the U.S. Congress and Colonial Tensions in the Suffrage Movement

Faced with the hesitations of the Puerto Rican Legislative Assembly regarding the extension of voting rights to women, the LSS turned to the National Woman’s Party (NWP), a U.S. political party that advocated for the addition of the Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution, to mobilize its contacts within the upper echelons of the U.S. government.²⁶³ In November 1927, through Senator Hiram Bingham, the NWP introduced a bill that would grant women’s suffrage in Puerto Rico.²⁶⁴ Shortly thereafter, in December of that same year, Representative Edgar R. Kiess, Chairman of the U.S. House Committee on Insular Affairs, introduced a similar bill before Congress.²⁶⁵ This marked the first time such a petition had been presented to Congress for an unincorporated territory.²⁶⁶

Several senators and representatives promised the LSS to endorse the bills if they advanced.²⁶⁷ In 1928, Dr. Marta Robert, secretary of the LSS and director of the Maternity Hospital of Puerto Rico, and Rosa Emanuelli, a school teacher from San Juan, were commissioned by the LSS to meet with members of the Territorial and Possessions Committees in both chambers of Congress.²⁶⁸ The chairpersons of these committees convened public hearings to discuss the legislation presented in each chamber.²⁶⁹ During these hearings, Dr. Robert and Emanuelli delivered presentations advocating for Puerto Rican women’s right to vote.²⁷⁰ Their arguments focused on the inherent right of Puerto Rican women to vote as a fundamental aspect of their citizenship.²⁷¹

The hearing held by the House of Representatives Committee on Insular Affairs on April 30, 1928, marked a pivotal moment in the struggle for women’s suffrage in Puerto Rico.²⁷² The committee was convened to discuss H.R. 7010, a bill introduced by Chairman Edgar R. Kiess, which sought to amend the Jones Act of Puerto Rico, originally passed in 1917, to explicitly grant suffrage to women on the island.²⁷³ At the heart of the bill was the proposal to modify Section 35 of the Jones Act, which had provided governance to Puerto Rico, by adding that “the right to vote shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex.”²⁷⁴

Mary Caroline Taylor, a representative of the National Woman’s Party, opened the proceedings by advocating for the bill’s passage and introducing key proponents from Puerto Rico, including Dr. Robert and Rosa Emanuelli.²⁷⁵ These women, deeply involved in the suffrage movement on the island, made impassioned arguments in favor of the bill, drawing parallels between their struggle and the broader women’s suffrage movement in the United States.²⁷⁶

Dr. Robert emphasized that Puerto Rican women, as U.S. citizens, deserved the same political rights as their mainland counterparts.²⁷⁷ She pointed out that the Puerto Rican Senate had passed similar suffrage bills on two occasions, only to see them fail in the Puerto Rican House of Representatives.²⁷⁸ According to Dr. Robert, this failure was not due to a lack of readiness on the part of Puerto Rican women, but rather political maneuvering within the House of Representatives.²⁷⁹ Dr. Robert noted that the women’s suffrage movement in Puerto Rico had a long history, dating back to at least 1919, when the first suffrage bill was introduced in the Puerto Rican legislature.²⁸⁰ Although this bill did not gain traction, the momentum for suffrage continued to build, with subsequent bills introduced in 1923 and 1925.²⁸¹

Emanuelli echoed Dr. Robert’s sentiments, framing the suffrage movement in Puerto Rico as part of a broader struggle for greater liberties and self-government.²⁸² Emanuelli was clear in asserting that Puerto Rican women were not asking Congress to undermine the authority of the Puerto Rican Legislature.²⁸³ They, instead, sought an amendment to their constitution to secure the right to vote for women, much like Suffragettes in the mainland United States had sought the Nineteenth Amendment when local efforts had failed.²⁸⁴ Emanuelli argued that the rights granted by the Nineteenth Amendment should have applied equally to U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico and those residing in the mainland.²⁸⁵

The testimony of these Puerto Rican women underscored the ongoing struggle for equality and political participation within a colonial framework. The fact that Puerto Rican women, despite being U.S. citizens, had to appeal to Congress for basic voting rights highlights the limitations of U.S. citizenship as it applied to the island’s inhabitants. The situation was further complicated by the unique political and legal status of Puerto Rico as an unincorporated territory, where constitutional rights could be selectively applied, as per the precedent set by the Insular Cases.²⁸⁶

In her remarks, Dr. Robert compared the situation of Puerto Rican women to that of American women before the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment.²⁸⁷ Just as women in the mainland had struggled to secure suffrage through their state legislatures before appealing to Congress, so too were Puerto Rican women now forced to seek Congressional action after repeated failures at the local level.²⁸⁸ The Puerto Rican Senate’s approval of suffrage bills, only to have them rejected in the House of Representatives, mirrored the challenges faced by women in the United States in their fight for the vote. By presenting the suffrage movement as a continuation of broader struggles for political rights in Puerto Rico, Dr. Robert linked
the women’s cause to the island’s long-standing efforts to secure
self-governance and political autonomy.²⁸⁹

Miss Emanuelli’s testimony further emphasized the broader implications of the suffrage movement in Puerto Rico.²⁹⁰ By linking the struggle for suffrage to the quest for greater liberties and self-government, Emanuelli framed the movement as part of a broader effort to secure fundamental rights for all Puerto Ricans.²⁹¹

The 1928 hearing before the House Committee on Insular Affairs highlighted the ongoing struggle for women’s suffrage in Puerto Rico. The testimonies of Dr. Robert and Emanuelli, representing the LSS, underscored the determination of Puerto Rican women to secure their political rights as U.S. citizens. The hearing also revealed the complexities of colonial governance in Puerto Rico, where U.S. citizenship did not automatically confer the full range of political rights, and where local political dynamics often frustrated efforts to secure greater liberties for the island’s inhabitants.

This strategy of appealing directly to the U.S. Congress highlights the importance of alliances between Puerto Rican feminists and their counterparts in the United States in the fight for suffrage. Moreover, it reflects the limitations of insular politics and the approach adopted by Puerto Rican women, who recognized that the local Legislative Assembly was not the only forum for their struggle for equal rights.

The senators of the Alianza party were vehement in their criticism of the suffragists, particularly targeting the LSS, for their decision to approach the U.S. government to request voting rights for Puerto Rican women.²⁹² This, they argued, was a direct affront to the sovereignty of the Puerto Rican Legislative Assembly, which held the prerogative to grant or deny suffrage within the island.²⁹³ The suffragists were labeled as “unpatriotic,” accused of discrediting local legislators before the federal government by creating the impression that Puerto Rican lawmakers, out of caprice or obstinacy, refused to extend suffrage to women.²⁹⁴ This critique not only exposed the internal tensions between Puerto Rican political factions, but also reflected the deep-rooted colonial dynamics that shaped the island’s governance.

The Bingham and Kiess bills, introduced in the U.S. Congress in 1927, proposed granting women the right to vote in Puerto Rico and significantly intensified the pressure on the island’s legislators.²⁹⁵ For the unionist senators who controlled the Puerto Rican Senate, these congressional initiatives were perceived as a violation of the limited legislative autonomy that Puerto Rico had under the Jones Act.²⁹⁶ The intervention of the U.S. Congress on a matter so central to the island’s political structure was seen as an overreach, exacerbating the already delicate balance of power between the colonial legislature and the federal government.²⁹⁷

This dynamic laid bare the colonial underpinnings of Puerto Rico’s political system. The fact that local suffragists had to appeal to the federal government for rights that should have been granted by their own legislature was indicative of the inherent limitations placed on Puerto Rican self-governance. The very act of turning to Congress for the extension of suffrage reinforced the perception that Puerto Rico lacked true autonomy in its internal affairs, a perception that was exacerbated by the senators’ vehement reaction.²⁹⁸ Their accusation that the LSS had discredited local lawmakers before the U.S. federal government underscored the colonial dilemma in which Puerto Rico found itself: while nominally possessing self-governance, its most crucial political decisions were still subject to the oversight and influence of Washington, D.C. In essence, the tension surrounding the suffrage movement became a proxy battle for the broader struggle over Puerto Rican autonomy and its colonial status.

Faced with mounting pressure from both the U.S. Congress and the suffrage movement, the unionist legislators in the Puerto Rican Senate felt compelled to act.²⁹⁹ They mobilized quickly to amend the island’s electoral code, hoping to preempt further federal intervention by extending suffrage to literate women.³⁰⁰ Between 1927 and 1929, no fewer than five bills were introduced with the intention of granting voting rights to women who could read and write.³⁰¹ This compromise, granting suffrage but restricting it based on literacy, reflected both the legislators’ desire to maintain some semblance of control over the political process and the pervasive elitism that informed many of their decisions. The literacy requirement effectively limited political participation to the educated classes, excluding large portions of Puerto Rican women, particularly those from the working class and rural areas. The compromise revealed the inherent contradictions in the island’s political elite who were willing to extend rights, but only within the confines of their conservative political vision.

Ultimately, on April 11, 1929, Senate Bill No. 2 was passed, granting women the right to vote but with the significant restriction of literacy.³⁰² For the suffragists, and particularly the LSS, this was a bittersweet victory. While the law represented progress, it fell short of their aspirations for universal suffrage.³⁰³

However, the story did not end with this partial victory. When the Republican-Socialist coalition came to power after winning the 1932 elections, the push for broader suffrage gained renewed momentum.³⁰⁴ Pagán introduced a bill advocating for universal suffrage, and this time, the political landscape was more favorable.³⁰⁵ In 1935, the bill was approved, finally granting Puerto Rican women the right to vote, regardless of literacy.³⁰⁶ This landmark legislation allowed illiterate women workers, many of whom had been at the forefront of labor movements, to participate in the 1936 elections for the first time.³⁰⁷

This shift towards universal suffrage in Puerto Rico had profound implications, not only for gender equality but also for the island’s evolving political landscape. The eventual enfranchisement of all women, regardless of literacy, reflected broader changes in the political consciousness of Puerto Rico, where class and gender intersected with the ongoing struggle against colonialism. By extending suffrage to all women, the island moved closer to fulfilling the promises of democratic participation that had long been denied under colonial rule. Yet, the process by which suffrage was granted, a process that involved external pressure from the U.S. government and internal resistance from the island’s political elite, remains a stark reminder of the enduring colonial dynamics that shaped Puerto Rican political life.

Conclusion

The extension of suffrage to Puerto Rican women reveals the complicated reality of pursuing progress within a colonial framework. While the drive for voting rights was fueled by the relentless efforts of Puerto Rican feminists, the fact that U.S. intervention ultimately played a role speaks volumes about the limits of local political autonomy. This dynamic highlights an uncomfortable truth: gains in social justice often required appealing to the very colonial system that denied broader self-governance in the first place. This wasn’t just the case with women’s suffrage. Labor movements, access to education, and even desegregation efforts in Puerto Rico followed similar patterns, where victories were shaped by both local struggle and decisions made in Washington.³⁰⁸ This is a reminder that, while these reforms were crucial, they didn’t emerge from a purely internal process of political evolution. Instead, they reflect the ongoing negotiation between Puerto Rican aspirations and the colonial structures that continue to shape the island’s political life.

The suffrage movement in Puerto Rico was deeply intertwined
with the island’s colonial status and the broader struggle for self-governance. The reaction of the Alianza senators, who viewed the appeal to the U.S. Congress as a betrayal of Puerto Rican autonomy, reveals the complexities of navigating colonial rule while striving for political reform. The literacy-based suffrage granted in 1929, and the eventual achievement of universal suffrage in 1935, illustrate the long and difficult road that Puerto Rican women had to travel in their fight for political equality.³⁰⁹ Through their persistence, figures like Dr. Robert and Miss Emanuelli were able to challenge both the gendered and colonial hierarchies that sought to limit their participation in public life. Their efforts paved the way for the enfranchisement of women, ultimately expanding the democratic rights of all Puerto Ricans and contributing to the broader struggle for justice and equality on the island.

As we reflect on the centennial of Morales y Benet v. La Junta Local de Inscripciones, it becomes clear how deeply intertwined Puerto Rico’s colonial status, and the denial of women’s suffrage were. The ruling of the Puerto Rican Supreme Court in 1924 relied heavily on the Insular Cases, a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that established a colonial framework allowing the U.S. to treat its territories as second-class entities. Through these cases, Puerto Rican women, despite being U.S. citizens under the Jones Act of 1917, were denied the political rights that mainland women had secured through the Nineteenth Amendment. This ruling exemplifies how the colonial logic embedded in the Insular Cases systematically maintained Puerto Rico’s subordination, denying full constitutional protections to its people.

The Morales y Benet decision, by categorizing suffrage as a political right that could be regulated by the Puerto Rican Legislature rather than a fundamental right, reinforced Puerto Rico’s unequal status within the U.S. legal framework. The ruling mirrored the infamous Balzac decision, which similarly concluded that U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans did not grant full constitutional rights. This framework effectively excluded Puerto Rican women from voting, reflecting the broader dynamic of colonialism in which both gender and national identity intersected to maintain political and social subordination.

However, the story of Puerto Rican women’s suffrage did not end with Morales y Benet. While the ruling exemplified the broader colonial imposition of third-class citizenship, it also ignited further activism. Puerto Rican women refused to accept their exclusion from the political sphere, and their continued advocacy led to a breakthrough in 1929, when the Puerto Rican Legislature granted women the right to vote—with literacy restrictions. This partial victory, significant though it was, continued to limit the political participation of women, particularly those from the working class and rural areas. Full suffrage was not achieved until 1935, when universal voting rights were finally extended to all women, marking the culmination of years of struggle.

The legal and political exclusion of Puerto Rican women, as underscored by the Morales y Benet ruling, was not just a gender issue but a manifestation of Puerto Rico’s broader colonial condition. The Insular Cases provided the legal foundation for this exclusion, as they justified the selective application of constitutional rights to Puerto Rico, framing the island’s inhabitants as subjects rather than full citizens. These legal precedents created a colonial hierarchy where U.S. federal law had the final say, and Puerto Rican laws and rights were contingent upon the decisions of Congress and the federal courts. The fight for women’s suffrage, therefore, was not merely a struggle for gender equality but part of a larger movement for political and legal self-determination.

Looking back on the past century, the legacy of Morales y Benet and the Insular Cases continues to shape Puerto Rico’s political status. The denial of women’s suffrage in 1924 was not an isolated event but part of a broader pattern of legal subjugation that has permeated all aspects of Puerto Rican life. Even today, the Insular Cases remain in effect, reinforcing Puerto Rico’s unequal treatment under U.S. law. The centennial of Morales y Benet serves as an opportunity to reflect on the progress made in women’s rights while also recognizing the ongoing challenges posed by Puerto Rico’s colonial status.

The eventual recognition of women’s suffrage in Puerto Rico marks a significant victory in the history of the suffrage movement, but it is also a cautionary tale. The fact that it took more than a decade after the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment for Puerto Rican women to secure the right to vote, and that they were initially subjected to literacy restrictions, highlights the limitations of legal reform under a colonial regime. The victory of 1935, when universal suffrage was finally granted, is a testament to the resilience and determination of Puerto Rican women. Yet, the broader struggle for gender equality and political representation continues as the legacy of colonialism still casts a long shadow over Puerto Rican society.

As we consider the hundredth anniversary of Morales y Benet, it is vital to remember that the women who fought for suffrage in Puerto Rico were not just challenging gender norms but also colonial legal structures that denied them full citizenship rights. The Insular Cases, which allowed the U.S. to selectively apply constitutional protections to Puerto Rico, were central to this exclusion. The fight for suffrage was intertwined with the larger struggle for political equality, and the lessons of that era remain as relevant today as they were a century ago.

The centenary of Morales y Benet serves as a powerful reminder of the enduring impact of colonialism on Puerto Rico’s legal and political system. While the recognition of women’s suffrage was a milestone achievement, it came about despite the island’s colonial status and the legal barriers imposed by the U.S. government. 100 years later, the colonial legacies that Morales y Benet and the Insular Cases represent still persist, and the fight for both women’s political rights and Puerto Rico’s political equality remains unfinished.

* Adjunct Professor, Pontifical Catholic University of Puerto Rico School of Law. J.D., summa cum laude, Pontifical Catholic University of Puerto Rico; Editor-in-Chief, Revista de Derecho Puertorriqueño, Vol. LX. M.A. in Contemporary Legal and Political Philosophy, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.