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The Plight of Women in Positions of Corporate Leadership in the United States, the European Union, and Japan: Differing Laws and Cultures, Similar Issues
Gender diversity in corporate governance is a highly debated issue worldwide. National campaigns such as “2020 Women on Boards” in the United States and “Women on the Board Pledge for Europe” are examples of just two initiatives aimed at increasing female representation in the corporate boardroom. Several European countries have adopted board quotas as a means toward achieving gender diversity. Japan has passed an Act on Promotion of Women’s Participation and Advancement in the Workplace to lay a foundation for establishing targets for promoting women. This Article examines the status of women in positions of leadership in the United States, several major countries in the European Union, and Japan. We focus on the legal backdrop in each jurisdiction regarding gender discrimination and studies tending to demonstrate the economic benefits of gender diversity. We conclude that although important steps have been taken in the direction of narrowing the gender gap in all jurisdictions examined, progress has been slow and difficult across the board. The issue of too few women at the top will not be resolved until there is a wider acceptance that female leaders can benefit their organizations and contribute to social and economic progress. Moreover, the presence of women on corporate boards is valuable in and of itself and the status quo ought to be further challenged in international business.Me Too? The Invisible Older Victims of Sexual Violence
A review of legal research on violence against women and elder abuse reveals a disturbing picture. There is hardly any American legal research examining sexual abuse of older women and its conceptualization in legal literature and treatment in the legal system. This Article attempts to fill the abovementioned gap and to bring the hidden issue of sexual violence against older women to light. Scholars writing on rape, violence against women, and elder abuse tend to analyze age and gendered sexual violence separately from each other, without accounting for their interplay. This Article proposes a conceptual framework of sexual abuse of older women that integrates age and gender in the analysis. To achieve this end, this Article examines 109 publicly available American cases involving sexual violence against women over the age of 60, between the years 2000 and 2018, which are based on a search of 1,308 American cases. Based on this new empirical database, this Article offers an opportunity for analyzing the social and legal “taboo” regarding sexual abuse of older women. Despite findings indicating that sexual abuse of older women (and older people in general) is a significant issue creating serious consequences for victims, the Article shows that legal actors, social workers, health professionals, family members, and society miss its signs. Sexual abuse of older women is being noticed and treated by the criminal justice system only when it reflects a “real rape” 1 scenario. The obstacles to effective prosecution and to full access to the criminal justice system are distinctive in the case of older victims because of the effect of age, the way age shapes the experience of older victims of sexual violence, the effects of sexual violence on the victims, and its interplay with gender. Although sexual violence against older women is a form of elder abuse, it should be viewed separately from other forms of elder abuse and should be understood as part of a wider context of gender-based violence. There is a need for a holistic approach to sexual violence of older women, which perceives the sexual violence as a unique phenomenon and provides older women with legal and social mechanisms that fit their needs and experience both as women and elderly people.Prescription Restriction: Why Birth Control Must Be Over-the-Counter in the United States
This Note argues that it is harmful and unnecessary to require women to obtain prescriptions for access to hormonal birth control. Requiring a prescription is necessarily a barrier to access which hurts women and hamstrings the ability to dictate their own reproductive plans. It is also an irrational regulation in light of the relative safety of hormonal birth control pills, particularly progestin-only formulations, compared to other drugs readily available on the shelves. Leading medical organizations, including the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists, advocate for over-the-counter access to hormonal birth control. While acknowledging that not every woman will have positive outcomes taking hormonal birth control pills, this Note argues that women are capable of taking hormonal birth control as directed and are able to self-identify if they themselves are at risk for complications. Following a long line of cases that establish reproduction as a fundamental right in the United States, it follows that requiring a prescription for access can and should be analyzed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clauses, particularly under the Undue Burden standard. Certain prerequisites, such as pelvic exams, once thought to be necessary to safely prescribe hormonal birth control, are now widely considered unnecessary in determining whether a particular woman can safely take birth control pills. This Note goes further and argues that such prerequisites are an unconstitutional method of holding vital medication hostage from women who desire to control their reproductive health.Contracting Around Gender Constructs: Transgender Men at Women’s Colleges
As the transgender community gains increasing visibility in society, women’s colleges have begun to address new questions about who is eligible to attend. One such question is whether students who come out as transgender men after matriculation are eligible to remain enrolled and graduate from these institutions. The main claims relevant to this discussion are (1) colleges’ right to retain their identity as all-women’s institutions; (2) the parallel rights of cisgender female students who explicitly choose to attend an all-women’s institution, and (3) transgender students’ competing right to avoid arbitrary or capricious dismissal based on gender identity. This Note posits that contract law provides a useful framework for colleges to evaluate this question since both express and implied contracts form the basis of the student- college relationship. Ultimately, this Note argues that, although solutions that satisfy all parties are impossible, harms can be minimized if transgender students are permitted to graduate and given appropriate support throughout the transition process, and other policies are adapted to address the concerns of cisgender female students.Properly Accounting for Domestic Violence in Child Custody Cases: An Evidence-Based Analysis and Reform Proposal
Promoting the best interests of children and protecting their safety and well-being in the context of a divorce or parentage case where domestic violence has been alleged has become highly politicized and highly gendered. There are claims by fathers’ rights groups that mothers often falsely accuse fathers of domestic violence to alienate the fathers from their children and to improve their financial position. They also claim that children do better when fathers are equally involved in their children’s lives, but that judges favor mothers over fathers in custody cases. As a consequence, fathers’ rights groups have engaged in a nationwide effort to reform the custody laws to create a presumption of equal parenting time, with no exception when one of the parents has engaged in domestic violence. Domestic violence survivors and their advocates, however, claim that the needs of survivors of domestic violence and their children to be safe and free from further abuse are not being met in custody cases, that their claims of abuse are not being believed, and that the harm when a parent commits domestic violence against the other parent is not being recognized and addressed by judges and the family law professional upon whom they rely. This Article first presents a literature review, with articulated scientific standards applied to each of the pieces of research cited in this review, on what is happening outside of court and in court relating to domestic violence and best practices for taking domestic violence into account in these child custody cases. Among the key findings from this literature review are: (1) when a parent commits domestic violence against the other parent, this can cause serious long-term harm to children, (2) custody judgments tend to favor fathers over mothers because greater weight is placed on claims of alienation than on domestic violence claims, (3) long-term harms can be mitigated by evidence-based best practices, most notably, supporting non-abusive parents in their efforts to protect themselves and their children from further domestic violence, (4) family law judges and professionals must be trained on domestic violence and its nuances, as well as how to screen for domestic violence, to adequately support them, and (5) a component of this training is learning how to distinguish mutual “situational couple violence” for which “parallel parenting” custody arrangements might be feasible, from a pattern of “coercive abuse,” where sole decision-making and primary parenting time should be ordered to the non-abusive parent, and protective restrictions on parenting time should be ordered to the abusive parent. The Article then reports on a fifty-state review of custody-related laws (laws determining which parent makes major decisions relating to the child, who is allocated primary parenting time, and whether protective restrictions shall be placed on the parenting time of a parent who has engaged in domestic violence). This review found serious gaps between what evidence-based best practices suggest, and what is currently required by law in many states. These gaps in the law, including the failure of the law to require domestic violence screening and training for judges and other family law professionals, contribute to poor custody decision-making by them that compromises the safety and welfare of domestic violence survivors and their children. The Article then proposes nuanced law reforms that would align custody-related laws with evidence-based best practices for taking domestic violence into account in custody cases, including creating rebuttable presumptions, burdens of proof, and definitions of domestic violence that conform with these evidence-based best practices.Getting to Equal: Resolving the Judicial Impasse on the Weight of Non-Monetary Contribution in Kenya’s Marital Asset Division
Marital property law reforms and changing international human rights standards in the late 20th and early 21st century prompted Kenya to end certain discriminatory practices against women, especially in the area of property rights. For 50 years, Kenya relied on England’s century-old law, the Married Women’s Property Act of 1882, to regulate property rights. In 2010, Kenya adopted a new Constitution that called for equality between men and women, and in 2013, Kenya enacted independent legislation in the form of the Matrimonial Property Act (MPA). The MPA provides a basis for trial courts to divide marital property upon divorce. Specifically, it provides that monetary contribution and non-monetary contribution are the only factors for dividing marital property on divorce. The Kenyan courts have issued contradictory decisions on the weight of nonmonetary contribution in long-term and short-term marriages. Without guidance on the weight of non-monetary contribution during divorce proceedings, the courts have left potential litigants, especially women, to navigate the unsettled waters of marital disputes in the legal system. Kenya’s Parliament should take steps to clarify the legislation, develop regulations on the weight of non-monetary contribution, and provide statutory factors for consideration during division of marital property. This will ensure that courts meet the overriding objective of achieving a fair outcome in marital property disputes. Because of the constitutional guarantee of equality, the courts must begin analysis of property division by assuming each spouse is entitled to half of the marital property.Born Free: Toward an Expansive Definition of Sex
The State of New York recently issued its first physician-certified “intersex” birth certificate, correcting a 55-year-old’s original birth certificate. This is a positive step towards eliminating the traditional binary approach to a person’s birth sex, but it creates potential uncertainties in the employment discrimination context. Over the past several years, the definition of what constitutes “discrimination on the basis of sex” has both expanded (with the legalization of same-sex marriage) and narrowed (restricting the use of gender specific bathrooms). Until recently it appeared that a broader definition of the term “sex” would become the judicial—and possibly legislative—norm in a variety of contexts. However, several obstacles have emerged to jeopardize true equality for the LGBTQIA community, including (1) inconsistent judicial opinions regarding the meaning of “sex,” (2) the increased ability of employers to utilize religion or “any other factor” as a defense to discrimination claims, (3) regressive executive policies regarding the definition of “sex,” and (4) uncertainty about the extent to which transgender individuals may remain in the military. Although each of these issues warrants thorough analysis and has sparked scholarly debate, in this Article we focus on another critical inequality: wage disparity. Specifically, we are concerned with the problem posed for DSD and transgender individuals, given the Equal Pay Act’s requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate they are paid differently from the “opposite sex” for a wage disparity claim. The Equal Pay Act (EPA) is outdated and discriminatory in its application, and it unnecessarily subjects an entire segment of the workforce—LGBTQIA individuals—to continued discrimination. The EPA requires that plaintiffs prove their cases through reference to an opposite sex comparator, but then defers to the employer’s subjective definition of who “the opposite sex” is. This makes LGBTQIA plaintiffs’ cases essentially unwinnable. Uncertainty for the LGBTQIA community is further compounded by the expansion of the employer’s right, under both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, to invoke religion, conscience, or “any other factor” as an affirmative defense to discrimination claims. In this Article, we discuss the interplay between a plaintiff’s sex-specific protections (against sex-based employment discrimination under Title VII and against wage disparity under the Equal Pay Act) and an employer’s affirmative defenses (under Title VII, the EPA, and current interpretations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). Our discussion concludes with recommendations for an expansive definition of the word “sex” and the adoption of the recently proposed Equality Act to help alleviate all forms of sex-based discrimination in the employment context.Removing Camouflaged Barriers to Equality: Overcoming Systemic Sexual Assault and Harassment at the Military Academies
The Education Amendments of 1972 introduced requirements to protect female students from discriminatory policies at post-secondary institutions. A portion of those amendments, commonly known as Title IX, require that no students be subjected to discrimination based on their sex by any educational institution or activity receiving federal financial assistance. An exemption under § 1681(a)(4), however, explicitly prohibits application of Title IX to any educational institution whose primary purpose is to train individuals for military service or the merchant marine. Although those students are still subject to stringent conduct standards, the service academies themselves are tethered to sex discrimination policies only by their goodwill, reputation, and the boundaries of the Constitution. Answering only to the Department of Defense (or Transportation, in the case of the United States Merchant Marine Academy) does not hold these institutions accountable to their students or to the American public. The academies’ attempts at combatting this widespread problem have been ineffective, and they continue to perpetuate a culture of sexual violence. This Note proposes the removal of exemption language from Title IX, or, alternatively, insists that the academies comply with mandatory reporting requirements under the Clery Act.Draft of a Letter of Recommendation to the Honorable Alex Kozinski, Which I Guess I’m Not Going to Send Now
This legal-literary essay engages the current social and jurisprudential moment, encapsulated by the hashtag #metoo. It focuses on the allegations, made in the first week of December 2017, that Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Alex Kozinski verbally sexually harassed former law clerks Emily Murphy and Heidi Bond. I wrote the lioness’s share of the piece during December 10–11—that is, in the days before news outlets reported that other women complained of Kozinski touching them on the thigh or breast while propositioning them for sex or discussing recent sexual encounters—and concluded that Kozinski was unlikely to face impeachment or meaningful judicial censure, but that he should nevertheless resign because his maintenance of his judicial position was untenable. What occurred next proved a shocking installation in the annals of American judicial history: After hiring feminist icon Susan Estrich as counsel and asserting that the claims against him were “not true,” Judge Kozinski did retire on December 18, 2017, explaining that he could not “be an effective judge and simultaneously fight this battle. . . . Nor would such a battle be good for [his] beloved federal judiciary.” Beyond qualifying me, for the first time in my life, more as a baffled Hildegard von Bingen than as a grouchy Cassandra, the most notable aspect of my essay is its form. It is auto-fiction, composed in the style of a letter of recommendation that an unnamed U.S. law professor attempts to write for a student who seeks a clerkship with Judge Kozinski during those frenzied and confusing first weeks of December. The “letter” also contains editorial comment flags, written by an unidentified colleague. The “foul papers” style of this letter permits an expression of the intense emotion catalyzed by the allegations against Judge Kozinski, and also allows us to consider the double bind that law professors and law students find themselves in with regard to clerkship applications tendered within a legal culture shaped by male dominance and white supremacy. Further, the document’s footnotes denote the copious subtext that can lie beneath the surface of oppressed people’s sometimes strangled speech. The employment of the comment flags allows for a certain amount of “cross talk” to this outpouring, critiques that mainly express the position of the hegemonic power structure (except for some gadfly citations to Janet Halley, Jacob Gersen, and Jeannie Suk). In these comment flags, we can see how even the most basic aspects of legal discourse (Bluebook conventions; formatting;professionalism) encourage denial of the emotional disorganization and rage that flow from sexual harassment and other kinds of oppression. We also can discern how legal discourse’s obsession with “relevance” stymies the engagement of racial, class, and queer intersectionalities. Additionally, it is worth noting that some of these comment flags ask hard and valuable questions. Together, this contest of voices and perspectives interrogates why calls for Kozinski’s resignation were “off the wall” on December 8—that is, that they were so unthinkable that he could gleefully brush them off during that first week of the month—but legitimate on December 18. N.B.: The piece is written as if it is still December 11, just after the allegations of verbal harassment were reported, but before the complaints about physical touching came out in national news. That is, it is “written” in the moments before Judge Kozinski’s reputation suffered irreparable blows, and his remained a sought-after clerkship despite longstanding rumors and complaints of his misogyny. In my efforts to harness the legal-literary style to uncover the effects and constructions of oppression, I take inspiration from Derrick Bell's Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism (1993), Richard Delgado’s Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 Michigan Law Review 2411 (1989), and Patricia Williams' the Alchemy of Race and Rights (1992). I also build upon Kathryn Abrams and Hila Keren’s Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions? 94 MINN. L. REV. 1997 (1998).The Strange Pairing: Building Alliances Between Queer Activists and Conservative Groups to Recognize New Families
This Article explores some of the legal initiatives and reforms that opponents of same-sex marriage in Canada and the United States have pushed forward. Despite being animated by a desire to dilute the protections for same-sex couples, these reforms resulted in “queering” family law, in the sense that they functionalized the notion of family. Consequently, two cohabiting relatives or friends would be eligible for legal recognition, along with all the public and private benefits of such recognition. I term these kinds of “unions” and other nonnormative relationships to be “new families.” The central claim of this Article is thus that new families should build alliances with conservative fringe groups and capitalize on their common interest in creating legal alternatives to marriage. Section I of the Article will provide a primer on the legal remedies available to non-normative relationships. Section II will engage in a comparative analysis of conservative reforms in the United States and Canada that ended up extending eligibility requirements to new families, or that, although currently restricted to conjugal couples, could constitute a viable model for protecting all new families, if their eligibility requirements were amended. Section III tries to operationalize legal recognition by analyzing the potential paths to gain it. I will first anticipate and respond to criticism surrounding recognition of new families, and then will lay the foundation for rethinking queer activists’ political action. I will then offer some recommendations (a) on the best model for implementation and (b) on forming alliances with conservative groups.